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THE SHORT-TERM AND LOCALIZED EFFECT OF GUN SHOWS: EVIDENCE
FROM CALIFORNIA AND TEXAS
Mark Duggan, Randi Hjalmarsson, and Brian A. Jacob
Abstract—We examine the effect of more than 3,400 gun shows using
data from Gun and Knife Show Calendar and vital statistics data from
California and Texas. Considering the one month following each show
and a surrounding area ranging from 80 to 2,000 square miles, we find no
evidence that gun shows increase either gun homicides or suicides. The
similarity of our estimates for California and Texas suggests that the
much tighter California gun show regulations do not substantially reduce
the number of firearms-related deaths in that state. Using incident-level
crime data for Houston, Texas, we also find no evidence of an effect on
other crime categories.
I. Introduction
THOUSANDS of gun shows take place in the UnitedStates each year. Gun control advocates argue that the
‘‘gun show loophole’’ makes it easier for potential criminals
to obtain a gun; the loophole basically allows unlicensed
vendors at gun shows to sell firearms without conducting
background checks on purchasers. In support of this claim,
gun control advocates commonly cite selected extreme
events, such as the April 20, 1999, Columbine High School
shooting during which Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold shot
26 students, killing 13. Subsequent investigations by the
U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
(ATF) revealed that a friend of Harris and Klebold had pur-
chased some of the weapons used in the shooting at a gun
show (Obmascik, Robinson, & Olinger, 1999). Though not
an issue generally raised by gun control advocates, one
might also be concerned that gun shows increase suicide
rates by providing individuals considering suicide with a
more lethal means of ending their lives. Proponents, how-
ever, argue that gun shows are innocuous since potential
criminals can acquire guns quite easily through other black
market sales or theft. Gun lobbyists often cite a U.S. Bureau
of Justice Statistics survey that found that only 0.7% of
state prison inmates who had ever owned a gun reported
that they obtained it at a gun show (Harlow, 2001).
In response to the concerns about gun shows, eighteen
states have closed the gun show loophole by passing legis-
lation that regulates the private transfer of firearms, and six
states have imposed additional regulations on gun shows.1
Despite this legislative activity, there is little empirical evi-
dence regarding the effect of gun shows and, to our knowl-
edge, no studies of the effect of gun shows on gun suicides.2
This stems in large part from the difficulty of obtaining
detailed information on gun shows and outcomes such as
crime or mortality. Moreover, because the timing and loca-
tion of gun shows is clearly not random, it is difficult to
infer the causal impact of gun shows by simply comparing
geographical areas with frequent gun shows to those with
fewer shows.3
This paper consists of two analyses that study the impact
of gun shows on both mortality and crime. The first analysis
examines the impact of gun shows on gun and nongun sui-
cides and homicides using a unique ZIP code by week-level
data set of all gun shows and deaths in Texas and California
from 1994 to 2004. During this period, there were more
than 2,200 gun shows in Texas and almost 1,200 gun shows
in California.
We chose Texas and California for this analysis for a
number of reasons. As the nation’s two most populous
states, they comprise approximately 20% of the total U.S.
population and accounted for 18% of total U.S. gun deaths
in 2000 (Office of Statistics and Programming, CDC). In
addition, these two states account for more than 13% of the
8.3 million background checks for firearms transfers con-
ducted by the FBI and state agencies in 2005 (Bowling
et al., 2006). They also rank among the top five states in
terms of the number of gun shows (U.S. Department of Jus-
tice and U.S. Department of Treasury, 1999). Finally, the
states’ gun show regulatory environments differ signifi-
cantly: California is known for having the most aggressive
gun show regulations, while Texas has none.
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1 States became particularly attentive to the gun show loophole after the
1999 Columbine incident and again after the 2007 Virginia Tech mas-
sacre. Even though the weapons used in the Virginia Tech shooting were
purchased at federally licensed stores and not gun shows, the Virginia
Tech Review Panel (2007) put together a report that recommended requir-
ing background checks for firearms sales at gun shows. Governor Kaine
made it a priority to enact such a law in 2008, but it was defeated in the
Virginia Senate.
2 Lott (2003) examines violent crime rates before and after the introduc-
tion of state laws to require background checks for private transfers of
handguns. Comparing 9 states that closed this loophole by 1994 to 33
states that never implemented such laws, he finds no evidence that these
gun show laws reduced violent crime and, in fact, finds that such laws are
positively associated with murder, robbery, and auto theft.
3 Lott (2003) finds that laws requiring background checks at gun shows
as well as laws banning assault weapons or imposing waiting periods are
negatively associated with the prevalence of gun shows in a state. He also
finds that western and rural states tend to have the greatest number of gun
shows per capita and that states with higher gun ownership rates have sig-
nificantly more shows.
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To address the potentially endogenous timing and loca-
tion of gun shows, we examine outcome trends within juris-
dictions where gun shows occur, exploiting the high-fre-
quency variation in deaths that we observe in the vital
statistics data. Our baseline empirical specification esti-
mates the impact of a gun show on the number of deaths in
a ZIP code in the week of a show and the three subsequent
weeks relative to the four weeks preceding a show, control-
ling for ZIP code by year fixed effects as well as month
fixed effects. Because ZIP code areas are quite small and
because the ZIP codes in which gun shows occur may be
primarily commercial (such as a convention center) and
attract many attendees from outside the immediate ZIP
code, we also estimate specifications that use the number of
gun shows that take place within various distances to the
home ZIP code.
Overall, we find little evidence that gun shows have a
significant effect on each of our four mortality measures:
gun homicides, nongun homicides, gun suicides, and non-
gun suicides. This finding persists across a variety of speci-
fications. First, we arrive at the same finding when estimat-
ing our baseline specification separately for California and
Texas ZIP codes, despite the differing regulatory environ-
ments in each state. Second, the results do not depend on
the geographical area considered: 0, 5, 10, and 25 miles
from the ZIP code in which the show occurs. Third, the
findings are not sensitive to the estimation strategy used or
alternative sets of fixed effects. Finally, we do not find evi-
dence of heterogeneous effects over time or across ZIP
codes with differing degrees of poverty, urbanicity, and gun
ownership.
Using a similar empirical methodology, the second ana-
lysis considers the impact of guns shows on gun and non-
gun violent crimes, as well as property crimes using a cen-
sus tract by week data set of all FBI Part I crime incidents
recorded by the Houston Police Department from 1994 to
2004. We identify the number of shows in each census tract
and within various radii of each tract. As in our mortality
analysis, we find no evidence that gun shows have a signifi-
cant effect on crime.
Our analysis has two important limitations. First, we
examine only the geographical areas in and around where
gun shows take place. To the extent that guns obtained at
shows are transported elsewhere, we do not pick up these
effects. In addition, our identification strategy relies on
high-frequency variation that, by definition, focuses on
short-term effects. Specifically, most of our specifications
look for spikes in various measures of mortality and crime
in the four weeks immediately following a gun show. How-
ever, guns are durable and can be used many years in the
future, and thus our estimates do not capture these long-run
effects. Despite these limitations, we believe that this analy-
sis makes an important contribution to understanding the
influence of gun shows, the regulation of which has argu-
ably been the most active area of federal, state, and local
firearms policy during the past decade.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section
II provides background information on gun ownership and
the institutional and legal arrangements surrounding gun
shows. Section III describes the data used in the analysis,
and section IV outlines our empirical strategy. Section V
presents our main results, and section VI concludes.
II. Background
A. Gun Ownership in the United States
Firearms manufacturing and ownership in the United
States are substantial. Approximately 5 million new fire-
arms were for sale in the United States in 2006, including
net imports.4 Using the 1994 National Survey of Private
Ownership of Firearms (NSPOF), Cook and Ludwig (1996)
estimate that approximately 192 million privately owned
firearms, including 65 million handguns, exist in the United
States and that about 35% of households own a gun. In con-
trast, the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
(U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2000) estimated that
approximately 242 million firearms were available for sale
or owned by civilians in the United States at the end of
1996, including roughly 72 million handguns, 76 million
rifles, and 64 million shotguns.
Previous research generally suggests a positive relation-
ship between gun ownership rates and both gun suicide and
homicide rates. That is, increases in gun ownership rates
are associated with increases in gun homicide (Duggan,
2001; Cook & Ludwig, 2004) and gun suicide (Kellermann
et al., 1992; Sloan et al., 1990; Azrael, Hemenway, &
Miller, 2002).5
B. Institutional Background on Gun Shows
Thousands of gun shows are held in the United States
each year.6 Shows are generally open to the public, though
attendees often pay a modest admission fee. Most shows
are held over the weekend and last for two days, drawing an
4 Specifically, in 2006, approximately 1.4 million handguns and 2.2
million shotguns and rifles were manufactured in the United States, with
just 0.3 million of these exported (U.S. Department of the Treasury,
2008). According to Census Bureau statistics published by Shooting
Industry magazine, an additional 1.1 million handguns and 0.7 million
rifles and shotguns were imported into the United States. See http://
www.shootingindustry.com/Pages/SpecRep6.html#importhand, accessed
August 29, 2008.
5 In contrast, Lott and Mustard (1997) find that crime declined in states
that passed concealed weapons laws, suggesting that gun ownership
reduces crime through deterrence. Though Moody (2001) supports these
results, Ayres and Donohue (1999) and Black and Nagin (1998) found
that the results were not robust to a variety of assumptions and modeling
choices.
6 Lott (2003) states that roughly 1,900 gun shows were held in the Uni-
ted States in 1991 and that this number increased to a high of 2,907 in
1996, but then declined to roughly 2,400 in 2001. Using the same data
source (a periodical titled Gun Show Calendar), the U.S. Department of
Justice and U.S. Department of the Treasury (1999) came up with a much
higher figure for the overall number of gun shows in 1998: 4,442 shows
compared with the 2,600 reported by Lott (2003).
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average of 2,500 to 5,000 people per show. To rent a table
from a promoter, vendors pay fees typically ranging from
$5 to $50. The number of tables at gun shows ranges
widely, from as few as 50 to as many as 2,000 (U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice and U.S. Department of the Treasury,
1999).7
The share of guns acquired by private citizens through
gun shows appears relatively small compared to other chan-
nels. The NSPOF estimated that approximately 239,000
firearms per year were bought at U.S. gun shows and flea
markets in 1993 and 1994. This represents just 4% of both
long guns and handguns that private individuals acquired
from all sources in those years (Cook & Ludwig, 1996).
Similarly, a 1997 survey of 18,000 state prison inmates by
the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics found that only 0.7%
and 1.7% of inmates who had ever owned a gun said they
had obtained it at a gun show or flea market, respectively
(Harlow, 2001). Yet an ATF study (U.S. Department of the
Treasury, 2000) found that 14% of their criminal trafficking
investigations between 1996 and 1998 involved guns pur-
chased from gun shows; about 46% involved straw pur-
chases (an individual purchases a gun for someone else),
and 20% involved unlicensed sellers.8
C. The Gun Show Loophole
Certain individuals, primarily felons and those convicted
of domestic abuse, are prohibited from purchasing or pos-
sessing a firearm under federal law.9 The so-called gun
show loophole refers to the fact that federal law requires
federal firearms licensees (FFLs)—those licensed by the
government to manufacture, import, or deal in firearms—to
conduct background checks on nonlicensed persons seeking
to obtain firearms, but it does not require such checks by
those who transfer firearms and do not meet the statutory
test of being engaged in the business to do so (Krouse,
2005). Therefore, whereas a gun dealer operating a gun
shop is obliged to conduct background checks on potential
buyers, private sellers at gun shows who ‘‘transfer’’ firearms
do not have to do so. These licensees comprise 50% to 75%
of the vendors at most gun shows, so some private venders
could use this loophole to entice potential customers to their
tables (U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of
the Treasury, 1999).
A number of states, however, have passed legislation reg-
ulating at least some of these sales. For example, California,
Rhode Island, and the District of Columbia require back-
ground checks on all gun purchases, including those at gun
shows. Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, New York, and Ore-
gon have less comprehensive regulations but also require
background checks for firearms purchased at gun shows
(Legal Community against Violence, 2008). The vast
majority of states, however, do not require a background
check for transactions occurring at gun shows.
Wintemute (2007) compared gun shows in California,
which is considered to have ‘‘a uniquely restrictive regula-
tory environment for gun shows,’’ with shows in Arizona,
Nevada, Texas, and Florida—four states that do not regulate
any private party firearms sales, including those at gun
shows. In addition to having background checks, California
requires that any individual who purchases a gun, whether at
a gun show or anywhere else, wait ten days before receiving
the gun.10 The results from this study suggest that there were
fewer illegal straw purchases and undocumented gun sales
at California’s shows. Thus, one might expect to find a very
different effect of gun shows in an aggressively regulated
state (California) than in one with no regulations (Texas).
We investigate this issue in the sections that follow.
III. Data Description
We create two data sets to investigate whether the num-
ber of deaths and crimes changes in the weeks leading up to
or following a gun show. The first data set is a week by ZIP
code panel of gun show and mortality information for Texas
and California for all weeks from 1994 to 2004. The second
data set, spanning the same years, is a week by census tract
panel of gun shows and seven categories of Part I crime
incidents for Houston, Texas. Both data sets are aggregated
to the week level (rather than the date) to increase statistical
precision and account for the fact that gun shows typically
occur on weekends, when mortality and crime rates are
likely to differ from other days for reasons unrelated to gun
shows. Using a symmetric time period as our unit of obser-
vation also reduces the possibility that pre-post compari-
sons will be driven by factors other than the existence of a
gun show. Because approximately 99% of Texas and Cali-
fornia gun shows begin on either Friday or Saturday, we
begin each week on a Friday and end it on a Thursday. This
7 Various types of firearms are sold at gun shows. These include new
and used handguns, shotguns, rifles, semiautomatic assault weapons, and
curio or relic firearms (those of historical interest, for example) (U.S.
Department of Justice, 2007). Gun show vendors also usually sell ammu-
nition, gun literature, and gun accessories. Gun shows often include knife
vendors and sellers of air guns. For the most part, gun shows offer fire-
arms for both those seeking to purchase handguns as well as sportsmen
and hunters (U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of the
Treasury, 1999).
8 See http://www.atf.treas.gov/pub/fire-explo_pub/pdf/followingthegun_
internet.pdf.
9 Eight categories under the Brady Act render individuals ineligible to
purchase or possess firearms: felony convictions, misdemeanor convic-
tions, fugitive status, an adjudication of mental illness, issuance of a
restraining order against the individual, people convicted of drug-related
offenses, underage status, or alien status. Many state laws contain these
same prohibitions. In addition, some state laws also prohibit people con-
victed of alcohol offenses and juvenile offenses from buying or posses-
sing firearms (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
2003).
10 Additional gun show specific regulations that exist in California are
described in California Penal Code 12071.4, which is also known as the
Gun Show Enforcement and Security Act of 2000. For instance, this
includes the requirement that each vendor at a gun show submits his per-
sonal information (name, birth date, driver’s license number) as well as
that of his employees to the producer of the show. It is also important to
note that regulations that apply to the purchase of a firearm at a location
other than a gun show generally apply to gun show purchases as well.
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results in 573 weeks of data (January 7, 1994–December
30, 2004) for 1,861 ZIP codes in Texas, 1,664 ZIP codes in
California, and 446 Houston census tracts.11
Information on gun shows was obtained from Gun and
Knife Show Calendar, a national magazine that lists the
dates and locations of gun shows throughout the country.12
For each Texas and California gun show from 1994 to
2004, we noted the ZIP code and dates of the show. For
those in Harris County, Texas (which contains Houston),
we also noted the 1990 census tract.13 For each ZIP code in
California and Texas, as well as each Houston census tract,
we then determined the number of gun shows in each week
of our sample. Finally, since gun show attendees may not
live in the show ZIP code or tract, we calculated the number
of gun shows each week within various distances of each
ZIP code or tract using the latitude and longitude of the cen-
troid of each location.14
There were 2,187 gun shows in Texas and 1,179 in Cali-
fornia from 1994 to 2004. Figure 1 presents the combined
annual number of shows in Texas and California. There is a
decrease from a high of 394 shows in 1995 to a low of 232
shows in 2001. This decline is seen in both California and
Texas. It is also important to note that gun shows are not
geographically evenly distributed. Only 120 Texas ZIP
codes and 98 California ZIP codes have at least one gun
show over the sample period. Likewise, the 338 gun shows
in Harris County occur in just eight census tracts, five of
them in Houston.
To examine the impact of gun shows on mortality, we
use individual-level vital statistics data for the deaths of all
residents of Texas and California.15 For each death, we
identify the date and ZIP code of residence.16 Consistent
with previous research, we use the International Classifica-
tion of Disease cause-of-death codes to focus on the number
of gun and nongun homicides and suicides per week in each
ZIP code.17 Figure 1 also plots the combined number of
annual gun homicides and suicides in Texas and California.
The number of gun homicides and suicides declined from
8,034 in 1994 to 4,845 in 2000 and then started to slowly
move up. This pattern is not being driven by any one state
or category of death. In a typical year, approximately 62%
and 64% of Texas suicides and homicides, respectively, are
committed with a gun compared to 48% and 72% in Cali-
fornia.
The second data set is created by merging the Harris
County gun show data with data on the number of Part I
crime incidents in each Houston census tract in each week
from 1994 to 2004.18 We group the seven Part I crime cate-
gories (homicide, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, motor
vehicle theft, and other thefts) into property crimes (bur-
FIGURE 1.—GUN SHOWS AND GUN HOMICIDES AND SUICIDES IN CALIFORNIA AND
TEXAS, 1994–2004
11 ZIP codes not listed in the 2000 Census were dropped from the analy-
sis since distances to nearby gun shows cannot be calculated. We also
omitted ZIP codes with either zero population or zero land area according
to the 2000 Census. These ZIP codes are omitted to allow us to consider
the number of deaths on a per capita basis and because the mortality data
are based on ZIP code of residence rather than ZIP code of death. Simi-
larly, one Houston census tract was dropped.
12 Communications with Garen Wintemute raised the issue that not all
gun shows are reported in Gun and Knife Show Calendar. Wintemute and
his colleagues found that 298 gun shows were held in California and
Texas in 2007 according to both Gun and Knife Show Calendar and the
Big Show Journal. But only 79% of these shows were listed in Gun and
Knife Show Calendar. The failure to identify such shows could potentially
bias our estimates towards 0. Although this is a valid concern, we do not
believe this omission will substantially bias our estimates. The shows that
are not contained in our data are relatively small, which might be
expected to have a smaller impact on gun-related deaths. However, even
if these shows are on average no smaller, a simple back-of-the-envelope
calculation reveals that the bias introduced by these omissions is likely to
be small. Suppose for simplicity that the true number of homicides in the
week after a gun show is X + Y and in any other week is X. Thus, in this
simplified example, the true ‘‘effect’’ of the gun show in this first week is
Y. Assume that the shows we miss occur only in weeks with no gun show
(a conservative assumption in that it will maximize the estimated bias).
Given that our analysis suggests that 4% of ZIP ! Week observations
have one or more gun shows within 10 miles, the figures of Wintemute
and his colleagues suggest that an additional 1% of ZIP !Week observa-
tions might have them. Thus, our weighted average for the ‘‘off’’ weeks
(1 out of 96 of which would actually be ‘‘on’’) would be approximately
X + (1/96)Y, which would introduce a bias of approximately 1% (leading
us to estimate .9896Y instead of Y) in our pre-post analysis. And to the
extent that these shows are smaller or also occur in ‘‘on’’ weeks, the actual
bias is likely to be even lower.
13 The 1990 census tract is used since that is the unit of identification
used internally by the Houston Police Department.
14 For the mortality analysis, ZIP code centroids were obtained from the
2000 Census. For the crime analysis, tract centroids were obtained from
the 1990 Census.
15 The California data were obtained from the Office of Health Informa-
tion and Research in the California Center for Health Statistics. The
Texas data were obtained from the Center for Health Statistics in the
Texas Department of State Health Services. We focus on deaths of state
residents to be consistent across states. For instance, while the California
data set also includes deaths of non-Californians occurring in the state of
California, the Texas data set does not.
16 Deaths with incomplete ZIP code information were dropped from the
analysis (0.9% of deaths in Texas and none in California).
17 Deaths due to the accidental discharge of a firearm and those that are
firearm related, but for which the cause is undetermined (accidental or
committed with intent) can also be identified. We focus on just homicides
and suicides given that gun homicides and suicides comprise 96% of gun
deaths over our sample period.
18 These data were obtained through an open records request to the
Houston Police Department.
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glary, motor vehicle theft, and other theft) and violent
crimes (homicide, rape, assault, and robbery) committed
with and without a gun.19 Violent crimes committed with a
gun decreased by almost 28% from 1994 to 1998; by 2002,
however, they had increased back to the 1994 level. In con-
trast, a general upward trend in both violent nongun crimes
and property crimes was seen over the same period.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the Texas and
California mortality data and demographic data from the
2000 Census. In table A1 of the online appendix, we present
comparable statistics for Texas and California separately.20
We present the average weekly number of gun-related
deaths per 100,000 residents and also list the corresponding
averages for gun homicides and suicides for the 3,525 ZIP
codes in our analysis sample. As the first column of the
table shows, the average weekly number of gun-related
deaths in a ZIP code is 0.309; almost two-thirds of them are
accounted for by gun suicides and most of the rest by gun
homicides.21
In column 2, we present analogous information for the
218 ZIP codes that have one or more gun shows during our
sample period. Interestingly, the average weekly number of
gun-related deaths per 100,000 residents of 0.217 is almost
30% lower than the corresponding average for all ZIP
codes; this is primarily driven by a lower number of gun
suicides per capita. Column 3 provides similar information
for the 1,596 ZIP codes with one or more shows within 10
miles during the eleven-year period. Although gun deaths
per capita are also much lower in this set of ZIP codes, gun
homicides per capita are almost 15% higher.
TABLE 1.—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
All ZIP Codes
Panel A: California and Texas
ZIP Codes One or More
Gun Shows
ZIP Codes with
One or More Gun Shows
within a 10-Mile Radius No Gun Shows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of gun-related deaths in ZIP Code !Week
All gun deaths 0.309 0.217 0.249 0.315
Gun suicides 0.203 0.126 0.147 0.208
Gun homicides 0.083 0.081 0.095 0.083
Demographic characteristics of ZIP codes
Total population 15,521 27,200 25,730 14,751
Population density (population/square mile) 1,966 1,916 3,944 1,970
Land area (square miles) 94.6 154.6 42.4 90.7
Fraction rural 0.466 0.176 0.145 0.485
Fraction Hispanic 0.245 0.298 0.281 0.241
Fraction black 0.065 0.086 0.089 0.064
Fraction below poverty line 0.151 0.181 0.144 0.149
ZIP is in an MSA 0.675 0.716 0.912 0.672
Fraction of suicides by gun 0.593 0.562 0.531 0.595
Number of ZIP codes 3,525 218 1,596 3,307
Number of ZIP !Weeks 1,952,850 120,772 884,184 1,832,078
All Census
Tracts
Panel B: Houston Census
Tracts One or More
Gun Shows
Census Tracts with
One or More Gun Shows
within a 5-Mile Radius No Gun Shows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of crimes in tract-week
Nongun violent crimes 19.33 24.86 27.63 19.27
Gun violent crimes 14.10 12.86 20.83 14.12
Property crimes 221.37 386.62 327.97 219.50
Demographic characteristics of census tracts
Total population 4,858 5,105 3,896 4,855
Population density (population/square mile) 4,008 4,425 4,826 4,003
Land area (square mile) 2.305 1.125 1.270 2.318
Fraction rural 0.028 0.000 0.011 0.028
Fraction Hispanic 0.249 0.210 0.296 0.249
Fraction black 0.272 0.386 0.295 0.271
Fraction below poverty line 0.200 0.249 0.246 0.200
Number of census tracts 446 5 221 441
Number of Tract !Weeks 247,084 2,770 122,434 244,314
Each cell contains the mean of the row variable for the sample indicated by the column header. The unit of observation in panel A (panel B) is ZIP Code ! Week (Census Tract ! Week). The number of gun-
related deaths per ZIP Code ! Week in panel A and crimes per Census Tract ! Week in panel B are per 100,000 residents. Population numbers in panel A (panel B) are based on the 2000 (1990) census. The ZIP
codes and census tracts in column 2 are a subset of those in column 3.
19 Whether a firearm was used can be determined for each of the four
violent crimes.
20 The online appendix referred to throughout the article is available at
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/suppl/10.1162/REST_a_00120.
21 Four percent of gun-related deaths in our sample are gun accidents or
gun deaths with an undetermined cause.
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Table 1 also indicates that ZIP codes with at least one
show within 10 miles during our sample period are signifi-
cantly different from other ZIP codes in terms of demo-
graphic characteristics. These ZIP codes have an average
population of 25,730, which is 74% greater than the corre-
sponding average of 14,751 for all other ZIP codes. Addi-
tionally, the average fraction of the population that is in a
rural area is substantially lower in ZIP codes close to a gun
show than in ZIP codes with no gun shows (14.5% versus
48.5%). The fraction of the population that is poor is similar
between the two groups of ZIP codes, while the fraction
that is black or of Hispanic origin is substantially greater
among ZIP codes that are close to a gun show (37.0% ver-
sus 30.5%). These differences and the others summarized in
the table indicate that gun shows tend to occur in more
urban areas with lower rates of gun ownership and with
higher population densities.
Panel B of table 1 provides analogous information for the
446 census tracts in the city of Houston, Texas, during the
1994 to 2004 period. We see that the 221 census tracts
within 5 miles of one or more shows had higher crime rates
(nongun violent, gun violent, and property) than the rest of
the city.22 This contrasts with the previous comparison in
panel A, though it is important to note that there are only
eight tracts in all of Harris County (of which five are in
Houston) with one or more shows during the period of
interest.
IV. Empirical Strategy
We are interested in examining the impact of gun shows
on mortality and crime. The primary challenge stems from
the fact that gun shows may occur in places or at times that
have more deaths (or greater crime) for other, unobserved
reasons. For example, as we saw in table 1, there is some
evidence that gun shows occur in places where relatively
fewer people own guns. Failing to account for this could
lead to spurious estimates of the impact of gun shows on
mortality. Similarly, the number of gun shows occurring in
Texas and California during weeks in the second quarter of
the year is significantly fewer than the number of gun shows
in other quarters; once again, this could yield spurious
results given the seasonal nature of homicide and suicide.
To address this potential endogeneity, we examine outcome
trends within jurisdictions where gun shows occur, exploit-
ing the high-frequency variation in deaths that we observe
in the vital statistics data. The key identifying assumption
of this model and subsequent ones is that the timing of gun
shows is not correlated with other factors that might directly
influence the homicide or suicide rate. The discussion that
follows focuses on our analysis of mortality in Texas and
California, but we follow an identical approach when exam-
ining crime in Houston.
We begin by estimating models that take the following
form:
yzt ¼
XK
k¼#K
bknshowsz;tþk þ kt þ czt þ ezt; ð1Þ
where yzt is the number of deaths in ZIP code z in week t,
and the nshows variables indicate the number of shows that
occurred in ZIP code z in the week t + k. That is, the
nshows variables are leading or lagging indicators. Specifi-
cally, the coefficient bk measures the impact on mortality in
the given week of having a gun show k weeks ago. Since
99% of gun shows take place over the weekend and weeks
are defined to run from Friday to Thursday, the coefficient
b0 captures the effect of a gun show on gun deaths during
the show and in the four or five days immediately following
it. Analogously, b#1 measures the effect of a gun show that
took place one week ago, while b1 measures the ‘‘effect’’ of
a gun show that will take place one week in the future.
This event history approach allows for tracing of the
mortality in the weeks leading up to and following a gun
show. The leading indicators serve two purposes. First, they
serve as a test for the presence of unobserved factors that
occurred close to the time of a gun show and that may give
rise to spurious correlations between gun shows and mortal-
ity. Second, they allow us to explore temporal substitution
in the number of deaths that might be related to the pre-
sence of a show. For example, if potential criminals ‘‘wait’’
to commit their crimes until a gun show provides the
chance to purchase a firearm, then one might see a decline
in deaths leading up to a gun show followed by a spike in
deaths immediately after. In practice, the inclusion of lead-
ing indicators does not change our results and does not yield
any indication of temporal substitution.23
To account for unobservable location and period-specific
factors that might be correlated with the occurrence of gun
shows and the number of gun-related deaths, we include a
set of Location ! Time Period fixed effects, denoted above
by czt. In our baseline model, czt represents ZIP Code !
Year fixed effects and captures location-specific factors that
are either time invariant or change slowly over time (for
example, demographic shifts, and changes in police prac-
tice). Our baseline model also includes month fixed effects
(separate indicators for January, February, and so on) to
capture common seasonality-related trends across ZIP
codes; this is denoted by kt. We later show that our results
are robust to a variety of alternative controls for unobserved
location or time effects.
22 For our Houston census tract analyses, we use 5 miles rather than 10
miles as our baseline distance given that the city of Houston is much
smaller than the entire state of Texas with just 600 square miles. For
example, a 10-mile radius for a show in the middle of the city would
include more than half of the city’s geographical area.
23 Other studies of the determinants of suicide have used similar specifi-
cations. For instance, Bollen and Phillips (1982) studied the effects of
publicized suicides (an imitation effect) using daily data and ten leads and
lags for news coverage.
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Figures 2 and 3 present event history figures that graph
the coefficients on ten leading and ten lagging gun show
variables. These provide a full and transparent picture of
the potential impacts. For the sake of parsimony, we then
estimate models that focus exclusively on mortality in the
four weeks following a gun show. We compare the post-
month mortality rate to the mortality rate in the four weeks
leading up to a gun show in order to difference out any
unobserved ZIP Code ! Time specific factors that might be
correlated with gun show timing and mortality. Specifically,
we estimate the following model:
yzt ¼ b1nsh8wkzt þ b2nsh4wkzt þ kt þ czt þ ezt; ð2Þ
where the first term measures the number of gun shows in
ZIP code z in the eight-week window around week t
nsh8wkzt ¼
P4
k¼#3
nshowsz;tþk
! "
and the second term mea-
sures the number of gun shows in the four weeks prior to
week t nsh4wkzt ¼
P0
k¼#3
nshowsz;tþk
! "
. We present the esti-
mate of b2, which reflects the difference in mortality in the
four weeks following a gun show relative to the four weeks
preceding a gun show. As in equation (1), kt and czt repre-
sent month and ZIP Code ! Year fixed effects, respec-
tively.
Thus far, we have focused on the relationship between
gun shows and gun-related deaths in a particular ZIP code.
However, ZIP codes are quite small. The median ZIP code
in California (Texas) is only 17 (52) square miles, and the
urban ZIP codes in which many gun shows occur are con-
siderably smaller in terms of land area. Indeed, in some
cases, the ZIP code in which a gun show occurs is primarily
a commercial area with a negligible residential population.
Although there are no data on the residential location of
gun show patrons, it seems likely that gun shows attract
many people outside the immediate ZIP code.24 Thus, one
might expect the presence of a gun show in a particular ZIP
code to influence the number of gun-related deaths in neigh-
boring ZIP codes.
If there were a strong reason to believe, ex ante, that gun
shows attract patrons within a certain geographical area,
then one would want to use this information in determining
the proper specification. In the absence of any compelling
evidence on this matter, we experiment with specifications
that allow gun shows to influence mortality in ZIP codes
located within various distances of the show itself. In our
baseline specification, we allow gun shows to influence
mortality within a 10-mile radius of the ZIP code in which
the show took place, which includes more than 300 square
miles. In these specifications, the nshows variables reflect
the number of gun shows that took place in ZIP codes
located within 10 miles of the ZIP code whose mortality we
measure. Note that the unit of observation for these regres-
sions is still the ZIP Code ! Week, and the outcome still
measures the number of deaths in ZIP code z in week t.
We then present results for 5-mile and 25-mile radii
(which includes approximately 80 and 2,000 square miles,
respectively), along with results limiting the impact of gun
shows to the ZIP code of the show itself. Unlike the other
sensitivity analyses we present, the results from these alter-
native specifications of distance to show will not provide a
falsification test for our baseline model. Although we have
some intuition that a gun show in one ZIP code will likely
influence mortality in neighboring ZIP codes, we have no
reason to believe that effects we find within, say, a 25-mile
radius are ‘‘better’’ than the effects within a 10-mile radius.
Instead, one should view this exercise as identifying where
potential effects may exist.
A. Estimation
Throughout the analysis, our outcome will be some mea-
sure of the number of gun-related deaths in a particular
location at a particular time. However, the choice of the
correct specification depends in large part on the way in
which one believes that gun shows influence gun-related
deaths. If one believes that a gun show will reduce the sha-
dow price of purchasing a gun by the same amount for all
individuals in each location, then (all else equal) one might
expect the impact of the gun show to be proportional to the
population in the relevant jurisdiction. For example, a gun
show that takes place in a town of 10,000 people might
allow the one person who is contemplating suicide suffi-
ciently easy access to a firearm to induce her to kill herself,
resulting in one additional gun death. In an otherwise com-
parable town of 100,000 people, one would expect there to
be ten such individuals who might be induced to commit
suicide by the ‘‘gun show–induced’’ availability of a fire-
arm. This type of proportional effect suggests a specifica-
tion in which the outcome variable is measured per capita
or relative to the average number of deaths in the loca-
tion.25
If one believes that gun shows will have a similar impact
on the number of deaths across locations regardless of
population, one could estimate an OLS model using the
number of gun deaths in a particular Location ! Week as
the outcome. This specification would be reasonable if one
believed that gun shows induce a smaller change in gun
availability (a smaller price reduction) for the average per-
son in larger geographical areas because transportation
costs limit the access to gun shows in large areas, or per-
haps because there are already many alternative ways to
24 Wintemute (2007) provided some evidence that this is the case. In his
study, he recorded vehicle licensure at two gun shows in Reno, Nevada,
and found that 31% and 32% of vehicles bore California license plates at
both of these shows.
25 To the extent that the total population is highly correlated with the
number of gun-related deaths in a jurisdiction, models that estimate pro-
portional effects relative to a population base will be quite similar to those
that use the number of deaths as the base.
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obtain a firearm without going through standard background
checks in larger areas. If the supply of guns available at gun
shows is limited relative to the demand, this might also be a
reason that the effect is not proportional to the population.
Because we believe that the effects of gun shows are
likely to be only partially proportional to population size,
we estimate several different specifications. To begin, we
estimate an OLS model in which the outcome is the number
of deaths.26 In addition, we estimate negative binomial and
Poisson regression models. In these models, the mean num-
ber of deaths (l) is modeled as an exponential function of
the predictors (l = exb), so that the resulting estimates
reflect the proportional effect of gun shows. Specifically,
the exponentiated coefficients from these models can be
interpreted as incidence rate ratios, which reflect the per-
centage effect of gun shows on the number of deaths in a
ZIP code.27 Both the negative binomial and Poisson regres-
sions are consistent under our identifying assumptions. The
negative binomial is a generalization of the Poisson regres-
sion model that allows the variance of the outcome measure
to differ from the mean. This technique is ideal for dealing
with count data with overdispersion since it provides more
efficient estimates than Poisson regression. In order to
accommodate the ZIP Code ! Year fixed effects in our
model, we use the fixed-effects negative binomial model
developed by Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984). How-
ever, Allison and Waterman (2002) have shown that this
model is not a true fixed-effects estimator in the sense that
it does not necessarily control for all stable unit-specific
covariates as does the standard linear fixed-effects model.
Thus, we present estimates from a fixed-effects Poisson
regression, which provides consistent estimates in the pre-
sence of time-invariant unit-specific confounding factors.
In all models, we account for possible serial correlation
within jurisdictions and other forms of heteroskedasticity.
In the OLS models, we estimated Eiker-White standard
errors that are clustered by ZIP code. In the negative bino-
mial and Poisson models, we use a block bootstrap where
the blocking variable is the ZIP code.
V. Results
We first describe our main results on how gun shows
influence mortality rates in California and Texas and then
present results that speak to the sensitivity and heterogene-
ity of these estimates. The final subsection explores the
effect of gun shows on gun and nongun violent crime and
property crime using data from Houston.
A. The Effect of Gun Shows on Mortality in California and
Texas
Following equation (1), figures 2a through 2d present
coefficients reflecting the effect of gun shows in the ten
weeks prior to and ten weeks following the occurrence of the
show. These coefficients come from our baseline model that
combines California and Texas and focuses on shows that
occur within a 10-mile radius of the ZIP code. The dependent
variable is the number of gun homicides, nongun homicides,
gun suicides, and nongun suicides, respectively, in the ZIP
Code !Week. All models are estimated using OLS.
The results shown in figure 2 suggest that gun shows do
not have a significant effect on any of our four mortality
measures. Moreover, the confidence intervals indicate rela-
tively precise estimates. For example, the upper bound of
the confidence interval for gun homicides rarely goes above
.002 deaths. Given a mean of roughly .022, this suggests we
can rule out effects larger than a 9% increase.
Interestingly, for some outcomes like gun homicides and
nongun suicides, it appears that mortality rates in a ZIP
code during the twenty-week window surrounding a show
are somewhat lower than in other weeks during the year in
the same ZIP code. While this may be a sampling variabil-
ity, it is possible that this pattern reflects the presence of
some unobserved factor that is correlated with both the
occurrence of gun shows and a reduction in mortality. For
this reason, our more parsimonious specifications measure
the effect of a gun show as the difference between mortality
rates in the four-week period following a gun show relative
to the four-week period preceding a gun show, the specifi-
cation detailed in equation (2).
Table 2 presents the results from this specification. In
addition to showing results for our baseline 10-mile radius,
we report results from specifications in which we allow gun
shows to influence mortality in locations at various dis-
tances from the show. In panel A, for example, we restrict
gun shows to influence mortality only within the ZIP code
in which the show occurred. In panels B through D, gun
shows are allowed to influence mortality in ZIP codes
within, respectively, a 5-mile, 10-mile, and 25-mile radius
of the ZIP code in which the show occurred. Regardless of
the geographical proximity to the show (0, 5, 10, and 25
miles) or the outcome (gun homicide, nongun homicide,
gun suicide or nongun suicide), it appears that gun shows
have no substantively important or statistically significant
impacts on mortality.
Table 2 reports the average effect of gun shows in Cali-
fornia and Texas. However, as we have noted, California
has much stricter regulations on gun shows than Texas, so
one might expect the effect of shows to be larger in Texas.
26 This model will suffer from extreme heteroskedasticity given the var-
iation in ZIP code size. Because we present cluster-robust standard errors
(clustering by ZIP code), our standard errors will be consistent but not
efficient.
27 One might also estimate models with a binary outcome indicating
whether the location experienced at least one gun-related death in a given
week. This approach may attenuate any effects of gun shows, however.
The reason is that large jurisdictions almost always experience at least
one death and, conversely, small jurisdictions almost never experience a
death. This will tend to bias the coefficients on our gun show indicators
toward 0. To see this, consider a large jurisdiction such as Los Angeles
that has at least one gun death every week. Here the coefficient on our
gun show measures will be 0 by construction. The same will be true for
jurisdictions where no gun deaths occur.
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To explore this potential heterogeneity, table 3 reports
results separately by state for our baseline specification that
measures the influence of a show within a 10-mile radius of
where it occurred. We find no significant effects of gun
shows on any of the four outcomes in either state. In the
online appendix (table A2), we present state-specific esti-
mates for our alternative geographical catchment areas (0
miles, 5 miles, and 25 miles). These results tell a similar
story.
B. Sensitivity of Mortality Results
Table 4 explores whether the results above are sensitive
to the model specification. Column 1 reproduces the base-
line results for gun homicides (table 2, panel C, column 1).
Column 2 shows estimates that are weighted by the total
population in the ZIP code (from the 2000 Census). The
results are extremely similar to the unweighted estimates.
Columns 3 and 4 show the exponentiated coefficients (and
p-values in parentheses) from negative binomial and Pois-
son regressions where the outcome is the number of deaths.
The sample sizes for these regressions are smaller than the
baseline because these models are estimated off the set of
observations for which there is at least one gun death in a
given ZIP Code ! Year. Column 5 shows the OLS esti-
mates for this same sample to allow one to distinguish
between differences due to sample size and those due to
model specification. Columns 6 through 10 present parallel
specifications for gun suicides. The basic pattern of
results—both magnitude and significance—is comparable
across specifications for homicides and suicides. (Table A3
in the online appendix shows these results separately by
state.)28
FIGURE 2.—EFFECT OF GUN SHOWS ON HOMICIDES AND SUICIDES IN CALIFORNIA AND TEXAS
Estimates come from the specification shown in equation (1) in the text. Rather than a one-month lag variable, however, there are ten lag and lead variables that indicate the number of deaths in the ZIP code during
that week. Week 0 indicates the week of the gun show. The sample is all ZIP codes in California and Texas that have at least one gun show within a 10-mile radius during the sample period.
28 Online appendix table A8 shows results separately by ZIP code popu-
lation. Consistent with the similarity of weighted and unweighted results
in table 4, we find no significant patterns by ZIP code population size.
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In our baseline specification, we include ZIP Code !
Year and month fixed effects. In the online appendix (table
A4), we present results from three alternative sets of fixed
effects: separate main effects for month, year, and ZIP
code; separate main effects for week defined over the entire
sample period (1–573) and ZIP code; and week of year (1–
52) and ZIP Code ! Year. The results do not change appre-
ciably across any of these alternative specifications.
C. Heterogeneous Effects
Table 5 reports estimates of our baseline specification by
ZIP code characteristics. To explore whether the effect of
gun shows differs by poverty and urbanicity, we present
estimates for three mutually exclusive ZIP code categories:
(a) ZIPs in which at least 30% of the population is living in
a rural area (as defined by the census); (b) ZIPs in which
less than 30% are living in a rural area and fewer than 10%
TABLE 2.—EFFECT OF GUN SHOWS ON MORTALITY, BY GEOGRAPHICAL DISTANCE FOR CALIFORNIA AND TEXAS
A: Within ZIP Code B: Within 5-Mile Radius
Homicides Suicides Homicides Suicides
Gun Nongun Gun Nongun Gun Nongun Gun Nongun
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
First month post-show 0.0014 0.0013 0.0018 #0.0019 #0.0001 0.0011* 0.0001 #0.0014
(0.0027) (0.0015) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Observations (ZIP !Weeks) 120,772 120,772 120,772 120,772 463,144 463,144 463,144 463,144
Number of ZIP codes 218 218 218 218 836 836 836 836
R2 0.056 0.027 0.032 0.033 0.101 0.032 0.032 0.034
Mean (dependent variable) 0.022 0.013 0.031 0.025 0.032 0.014 0.027 0.026
s.d. (dependent variable) 0.159 0.119 0.178 0.159 0.194 0.122 0.167 0.162
C: Within 10-Mile Radius D: Within 25-Mile Radius
Homicides Suicides Homicides Suicides
Gun Nongun Gun Nongun Gun Nongun Gun Nongun
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
First month post-show #0.0005 #0.0002 #0.0004 #0.0004 #0.0001 0.0001 #0.0003 #0.0003
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Observations (ZIP !Weeks) 884,184 884,184 884,184 884,184 1,550,646 1,550,646 1,550,646 1,550,646
Number of ZIP codes 1,596 1,596 1,596 1,596 2,799 2,799 2,799 2,799
R2 0.105 0.033 0.033 0.035 0.104 0.034 0.036 0.038
Mean (dependent variable) 0.029 0.012 0.025 0.023 0.019 0.008 0.019 0.016
s.d. (dependent variable) 0.183 0.113 0.158 0.157 0.148 0.093 0.137 0.132
The sample for panel A is ZIP codes that have at least one gun show during the sample period. For panels, B, C, and D, it is ZIP codes with at least one gun show within a 5-, 10-, and 25-mile radius, respectively,
during the sample period. The first-month post-show lag indicates the number of gun shows during the past month within ZIP code and within a 5-, 10-, or 25-mile radius for the respective samples. The coefficient
gives the effect of gun shows on deaths during the month following the show, as compared to deaths during the month prior to the show. The unit of observation is ZIP Code !Week. Standard errors (in parenthesis)
are clustered by ZIP code. Uses Month and ZIP Code ! Year Fixed Effects. *Significant at 10%.
TABLE 3.—EFFECT OF GUN SHOWS ON MORTALITY WITHIN A 10-MILE RADIUS, BY STATE
Homicides Suicides
Gun Nongun Gun Nongun
(1) (2) (3) (4)
California
First month post-show 0.0002 0.0001 0.0005 #0.0001
(0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0009)
Observations (ZIP !Weeks) 499,154 499,154 499,154 499,154
Number of ZIP Codes 901 901 901 901
R2 0.120 0.034 0.033 0.034
Mean (dependent variable) 0.035 0.013 0.025 0.028
s.d. (dependent variable) 0.203 0.117 0.159 0.176
Texas
First month post-show #0.0010 #0.0004 #0.0011 #0.0006
(0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0006)
Observations (ZIP !Weeks) 385,030 385,030 385,030 385,030
Number of ZIP Codes 695 695 695 695
R2 0.065 0.032 0.033 0.030
Mean (dependent variable) 0.021 0.011 0.024 0.016
s.d. (dependent variable) 0.153 0.108 0.157 0.127
The sample for columns 1–4 is ZIP codes that have at least one gun show within a 10-mile radius during the sample period. The first-month post-show lag indicates the number of gun shows during the past month
within a 10-mile radius. The coefficient gives the effect of gun shows on deaths during the month following the show, as compared to deaths during the month prior to the show. The unit of observation is ZIP Code !
Week. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by ZIP code. Uses month and ZIP Code! Year fixed effects.
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are below the poverty line; and (c) ZIPs where fewer than
30% are living in a rural area but at least 10% are in pov-
erty. These groups are meant to roughly capture rural and
urban nonpoor and urban poor areas. We do not see any
noticeable patterns across groups (and none of the indivi-
dual estimates are significantly different from 0). These
basic results are not sensitive to moderate changes in the
definition of these groups and are similar if one looks within
Texas and California separately (table A5 in the online
appendix).
To the extent that gun shows influence homicide and sui-
cide rates by increasing the availability of guns, one might
think that the effects would be smaller in locations where
guns are more readily available. Although we do not have
any direct measures of gun ownership, following Azrael,
Cook, and Miller (2004), we use the fraction of suicides
committed with a gun as a proxy for gun ownership. Speci-
fically, table 6 shows the results of splitting the sample into
three groups: low (bottom 25% of ZIP codes), moderate
(middle 50% of ZIP codes), and high (top 25% of ZIP
codes) gun ownership. Once again, none of the individual
estimates are significantly different from 0. (Online appen-
dix table A6 shows comparable results separately by state.)
Our sample spans eleven years, during which there were
substantial economic and political changes along with cor-
responding changes in national crime statistics. For exam-
ple, from 1994 to 1999, the number of homicides in the
United States decreased by more than 33%; from 1999 to
2004, the annual number of homicides began to slowly
increase. As mentioned previously and shown in figure 1,
similar patterns are seen in the annual number of gun deaths
in Texas and California. For this reason, we estimate our
models separately for 1994–1999 and 2000–2004. The
results, shown in online appendix table A7, indicate no
notable difference across time periods in either state (all
effects are statistically indistinguishable from 0, and rela-
tively small in magnitude).
D. The Effect of Gun Shows on Violent and Property Crime
in Houston
The results presented suggest that gun shows in Califor-
nia and Texas do not have a significant short-run effect on
local homicide or suicide rates. However, it is possible that
the occurrence of a gun show might influence the preva-
lence of other types of crime, such as assaults or robberies.
To examine this issue, we estimate models similar to those
discussed on tract-level crime data for Houston from 1994
to 2004. In our preferred specification discussed below, we
focus on effects within a 5-mile radius of the gun show and
discuss results from OLS regressions where the outcome is
the simple number of crimes in a tract week.
Figure 3 presents coefficients reflecting the effect of gun
shows in the ten weeks prior to and ten weeks following the
occurrence of the show, which are based on estimates from
equation (1). The solid line reflects the point estimates, and
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the dashed line reflects the corresponding 95% confidence
band. Looking across the figures for gun violent crimes
(panel A), nongun violent crimes (panel B), and property
crimes (panel C), we see no evidence that gun shows influ-
ence the prevalence of any type of crime. With regard to
gun violent crimes, the point estimates bounce around 0,
never exceeding 0.02, and the 95% confidence interval for
most weeks is between #0.02 and 0.02. Given that the
number of gun violent crimes in the average tract-week
observation is 0.386, this suggests we can rule out effects
larger than 6%. For nongun violent and property crimes,
our estimates rule out effects larger than 2% and 1%,
respectively.
To more precisely and parsimoniously summarize these
results, table 7 reports estimates of crime effects from equa-
tion (2), which describes the impact of a gun show on crime
in the four-week period following the show relative to the
four-week period preceding the show. None of the estimates
TABLE 5.—EFFECT OF GUN SHOWS ON MORTALITY IN CALIFORNIA AND TEXAS, BY POVERTY AND URBANICITY
Gun Homicides Gun Suicides
Rural Urban Nonpoor Urban Poor Rural Urban Nonpoor Urban Poor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First month post-show 0.0002 #0.0002 #0.0008 #0.0019 0.0009 #0.0011
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0008)
Observations (ZIP !Weeks) 142,378 298,606 443,200 142,378 298,606 443,200
Number of ZIP codes 257 539 800 257 539 800
R2 0.026 0.033 0.103 0.035 0.030 0.032
Mean (dependent variable) 0.003 0.011 0.049 0.011 0.026 0.028
s.d. (dependent variable) 0.061 0.108 0.238 0.105 0.161 0.170
Nongun Homicides Nongun Suicides
Rural Urban Nonpoor Urban Poor Rural Urban Nonpoor Urban Poor
First month post-show 0.0001 0.0001 #0.0004 #0.0008 0.0003 #0.0007
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0007)
Observations (ZIP !Weeks) 142,378 298,606 443,200 142,378 298,606 443,200
Number of ZIP codes 257 539 800 257 539 800
R2 0.024 0.023 0.031 0.029 0.029 0.035
Mean (dependent variable) 0.002 0.006 0.019 0.006 0.025 0.027
s.d. (dependent variable) 0.048 0.084 0.141 0.076 0.170 0.166
The sample is ZIP codes that have at least one gun show within a 10-mile radius during the sample period. Rural is defined as at least 30% rural as defined by the Census. Urban nonpoor is defined as less than 30%
rural and less than 10% of percent of population below the poverty line. Urban poor is defined as less than 30% rural and at least 10% of population above the povery line. The first-month post-show lag indicates the
number of gun shows within a 10-mile radius during the past month. The coefficient gives the effect of gun shows on deaths during the month following the show, as compared to deaths during the month prior to the
show. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by ZIP code. The unit of observation is ZIP Code !Week. Uses month and ZIP Code ! Year fixed effects.
TABLE 6.—EFFECT OF GUN SHOWS ON MORTALITY IN TEXAS AND CALIFORNIA, BY GUN OWNERSHIP
Low Gun
Ownership
Gun Homicides
and Moderate
Gun Ownership
High Gun
Ownership
Low Gun
Ownership
Gun Suicides
and Moderate
Gun Ownership
High Gun
Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First month post-show 0.0007 #0.0003 #0.0022 #0.0005 0.0002 #0.0018
(0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0015)
Observations (ZIP !Weeks) 216,060 434,336 204,426 216,060 434,336 204,426
Number of ZIP codes 390 784 369 390 784 369
R2 0.099 0.108 0.089 0.031 0.029 0.035
Mean (dependent variable) 0.025 0.036 0.020 0.015 0.031 0.025
s.d. (dependent variable) 0.170 0.206 0.153 0.125 0.177 0.160
Nongun Homicides Nongun Suicides
Low Gun
Ownership
Moderate Gun
Ownership
High Gun
Ownership
Low Gun
Ownership
Moderate Gun
Ownership
High Gun
Ownership
First month post-show 0.0000 #0.0004 0.0000 0.0010 #0.0012 #0.0001
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Observations (ZIP !Weeks) 216,060 434,336 204,426 216,060 434,336 204,426
Number of ZIP codes 390 784 369 390 784 369
R2 0.034 0.032 0.032 0.037 0.029 0.028
Mean (dependent variable) 0.012 0.014 0.009 0.030 0.027 0.010
s.d. (dependent variable) 0.113 0.124 0.097 0.191 0.165 0.099
The sample is ZIP codes that have at least one gun show within a 10-mile radius and one suicide during the sample period. The first-month post-show lag indicates the number of gun shows within a 10-mile radius
during the past month. The coefficient gives the effect of gun shows on deaths during the month following the show, as compared to deaths during the month prior to the show. Fraction of suicides committed with a
gun is used to proxy gun ownership. Low gun ownership is defined as the bottom 25% of California and Texas ZIP codes; moderate is the middle 50%; and high is the top 25%. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered by ZIP code. The unit of observation is ZIP Code !Week. Uses month and ZIP Code ! Year fixed effects.
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are statistically different than zero, and all are relatively
precise. For example, given that the average number of gun
violent crimes within a tract-week observation in Houston
during this period is 0.386, our estimates imply that we can
rule out effects larger than 1.5% of the mean. The estimates
for nongun violent and property crimes are even smaller in
relative magnitude and equally insignificant.
In results available in the online appendix, we show that
the general conclusion of no effect is robust to negative
binomial, Poisson and population-weighted OLS estimates
(table A9), to specifications that include alternative controls
for time and location (table A10), and to alternate choices
of geographical proximity to a gun show (table A11).
Finally, in results not reported but available on request, we
demonstrate that gun shows have no effect on more finely
grained crime categories including robberies, burglaries,
motor vehicle thefts, assaults, and rapes. In summary, it
appears that the occurrence of a gun show does not signifi-
cantly affect short-run crime rates in localized areas.
VI. Conclusion
Thousands of gun shows take place in the United States
every year. Gun control advocates argue that the gun show
loophole that exists in many states makes it easier for poten-
tial criminals to obtain a gun. Gun shows may also affect
suicide rates by increasing the ease with which individuals
who are contemplating suicide can obtain a more lethal
device. Opponents of gun show regulations argue that gun
shows are innocuous because potential criminals and other
individuals can acquire guns easily through other channels.
In this paper, we have investigated the effect of gun
shows using eleven years of data on the date and location of
every gun show in California and Texas, the nation’s two
most populous states. To study the effect on mortality
(homicide and suicide, in particular), we have combined
this with information on the date, location, and cause of
every death occurring in these same two states during our
eleven-year study period. To study the effect of gun shows
on violent and property crime, we combine the gun show
data with crime data provided by the Houston Police
Department from 1994 to 2004.
TABLE 7.—EFFECT OF GUN SHOWS ON CRIME IN HOUSTON, TEXAS
Nongun
Violent
Crimes
Gun
Violent
Crimes
Property
Crimes
First month post-show #0.0089 #0.0040 #0.0121
(0.0080) (0.0052) (0.0199)
Observations (Tract !Weeks) 122,434 122,434 122,434
Number of census tracts 221 221 221
R2 0.311 0.193 0.735
Mean (dependent variable) 1.063 0.386 5.085
s.d. (dependent variable) 1.416 0.768 5.090
The sample is census tracts that have at least one gun show within a 5-mile radius during the sample
period. The first-month post-show lag indicates the number of gun shows within a 5-mile radius during
the past month. The coefficient gives the effect of gun shows on crimes during the month following the
show, as compared to crimes during the month prior to the show. The unit of observation is Census Tract !
Week. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by census tract. Uses month and Census Tract !
Year Fixed Effects.
FIGURE 3.—EFFECT OF GUN SHOWS ON CRIME IN HOUSTON
Estimates come from the specification shown in equation (1) in the text. Rather than a one-month lag
variable, however, there are ten lag and lead variables that indicate the number of crimes in the census
tract during that week. Week 0 indicates the week of the gun show. The sample is all census tracts in
Houston that have at least one gun show within a 5-mile radius during the sample period.
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Using both event study techniques and specifications that
estimate the difference in mortality in the four weeks fol-
lowing a gun show relative to the four weeks preceding a
show, we find no evidence that gun shows have an effect on
any of our outcome measures: gun and nongun homicides,
gun and nongun suicides, gun and nongun violent crimes,
and property crime. In addition, the mortality results are the
same in both Texas and California, despite the fact that
California arguably has the strictest gun show regulations
while Texas’s regulations are among the least stringent.
Thus, our results suggest that gun shows do not increase the
number of homicides or suicides and that the absence of
gun show regulations does not increase the number of gun-
related deaths as proponents of these regulations suggest.
There are, however, two important caveats to our ana-
lyses. First, we are considering only the effect in the geo-
graphical area immediately surrounding gun shows. To the
extent that firearms purchased at gun shows are transported
more than 25 miles away from the show, our identification
strategy will not capture this effect. In addition, we consider
the effect only in the four weeks immediately following a
gun show. However, guns are durable, and thus to the
extent that effects occur much later, our analysis will not
capture this.
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